There’s no quick or easy way to end Yemen’s six-year civil war — a brutal conflict between the Iran-backed Houthi rebels and a range of forces lined up against them, most prominently, the country’s Saudi Arabia-backed government. There are, however, ways to prolong it, one of those being the Trump administration’s apparent decision to designate the Houthi movement as terrorists. Such a designation could precipitate what the United Nations describes as “the worst famine the world has seen in decades,” chill diplomatic efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement and push the Houthis closer to Iran’s leaders.

Arguments in favor of a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation — and the sanctions that go with it — are familiar: In a Washington Times op-ed last month, Yemen’s minister of information explicitly called for such a designation to facilitate, among other things, “freezing its assets.” In recent days, Saudi foreign minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan al-Saud said an FTO designation was “entirely appropriate.” They see it as necessary to hinder any Houthi attempts to achieve international recognition for their de facto control of northern Yemen and cut off resources for their war effort. The Trump administration wants to further its “maximum pressure” campaign directed at Iran’s regime by going after one of its apparent proxies.

But in the waning days of Trump’s presidency when administration officials, chiefly Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, seem intent on blithely increasing sanctions, it’s important to remember that these measures aren’t just a symbolic way to signal a get-tougher stance toward America’s foes. They have real-life consequences and often life-threatening ones for ordinary citizens in affected countries.

As the State Department’s website notes, when Washington designates a group as an FTO, it is “unlawful for a person in the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to knowingly provide ‘material support or resources’” to any member of that group. To say that the material support provision reaches far would be an understatement; lawyers tell us that it technically makes buying a cup of coffee for a member of a designated group a potentially sanctionable offense, a powerful disincentive to go anywhere near it. In some situations, this might plausibly be a defensible approach.

What’s the best way to deal with Iran? The nuclear agreement Trump ditched.

But the Houthis aren’t a small rebel group hiding out in Yemen’s hinterlands, isolated from the rest of the population. They control Sanaa, Yemen’s capital, and Hodeidah, one of its busiest ports. They exert considerable influence over various commercial entities. They have enough power to levy goods entering the territory they control, even when these goods first come into areas held by their rivals, and at one point said they would take 2 percent off the top of incoming humanitarian aid. In short, they are in a position to benefit from almost everything that enters the country, and thus almost everything that enters the country could fall within the scope of potential U.S. sanctions.

An FTO designation would, indeed, hurt the Houthis’ finances. But it could come at a steep cost for ordinary Yemenis: International businesses that enable global trade — shippers, insurers and bankers — would probably conclude that it isn’t worth the risk to do business, not just in Houthi-controlled areas, but in Yemen as a whole. The fear of criminal liability or economic sanctions could severely curtail financial and trade inflows nationwide, depreciating Yemen’s currency and ratcheting up the price of basic foodstuffs in a country where 60 percent of the population is food-insecure.

The Houthis’ foes may believe this would be a price worth paying if it were to bring the rebels to their knees. But the political logic for an FTO designation isn’t clear-cut: The U.N. special envoy for Yemen has spent months attempting to negotiate a nationwide cease-fire with economic and humanitarian confidence-building measures and a return to talks between the Houthis and the internationally recognized government. There is a not-so-secret back channel between Houthi leaders and Saudi officials that has also been working in fits and starts. Efforts along both of these diplomatic tracks have languished because of mistrust between the parties that would only intensify with additional sanctions. The Houthis have responded poorly to coercive measures in the past, arguing that their attacks in Saudi Arabia are, in part, a response to Saudi aggression. They are likely to see a terrorist designation from a U.S. administration as a clear sign of bad faith. In that event, where other than Iran are they likely to turn for additional support?